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Abstract
There are currently 23,500 level crossings in Australia, broadly divided active level crossings with flashing lights; and passive 
level crossings controlled by stop and give way signs. The current strategy is to annually upgrade passive level crossings with
active controls within a given budget, but the 5,900 public passive crossings are too numerous to be upgraded all. The rail 
industry is considering alternative options to treat more crossings. One of them is to use lower cost equipment with reduced 
safety integrity level, but with a design that would fail to a safe state: in case of the impossibility for the system to know whether 
a train is approaching, the crossing changes to a passive crossing. This is implemented by having a STOP sign coming in front of 
the flashing lights. While such design is considered safe in terms of engineering design, questions remain on human factors. In 
order to evaluate whether such approach is safe, we conducted a driving simulator study where participants were familiarized
with the new active crossing, before changing the signage to a passive crossing. Our results show that drivers treated the new
crossing as an active crossing after the novelty effect had passed. While most participants did not experience difficulties with the 
crossing being turned back to a passive crossing, a number of participants experienced difficulties stopping in time at the first 
encounter of such passive crossing. Worse, a number of drivers never realized the signage had changed, highlighting the link
between the decision to brake and stop at an active crossing to the lights flashing. Such results show the potential human factor 
issues of changing an active crossing to a passive crossing in case of failure of the detection of the train.
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1. Introduction
There are currently 23,500 level crossings in Australia, broadly divided into one of two categories: active level 
crossings with flashing lights; and passive level crossings controlling traffic solely with stop and give way signs. 
Level crossing crashes continue to result in enormous human and financial cost to society. According to the ATSB, 
there were 578 road vehicle collisions at Railway Level crossing (RLX) between 2001 and 2008 [1]. Many of these
collisions between road vehicles and trains occur at level crossings with passive controls. Grade separation, 
upgrading all passively protected crossings to active protection and the closure of crossings are undoubtedly the 
most effective approaches to reducing the rates of collisions and violations at railway level crossings. However, the 
feasibility of such approaches is questionable given economic and logistical implications [2]. It is impracticable to 
upgrade the 18,900 passive crossings due to various challenges such as the high number of private and occupational 
crossings (13,000), the remote location nature of such crossings, the lack of power available on site and the difficulty 
to reach viable cost-benefit ratios for crossing with low road and rail traffic. 
Most analyses have demonstrated that errors or violations on the part of the road user represent the largest 
contributor to RLX crashes [1, 3, 4], indicating the need for innovative interventions targeted at drivers to 
complement current railway interventions. The rail industry is therefore interested in new approaches to reduce the 
number of crashes at passive level crossings. 
There is some evidence to suggest the effectiveness of traditional approaches to level crossing safety, however 
much more research is required to properly evaluate emerging technologies. Emerging technologies might be 
optimally used as a comparatively low-cost approach to increasing safety at passively protected crossings. Various 
studies have been conducted in order to evaluate the effect of various railway level crossings interventions on driver 
behavior, such as traffic lights [5], rumble strips and in-vehicle systems [6, 7]. Traffic signals at railway level 
crossings do not appear to offer any safety benefits over and above flashing red lights, and rumble strips seem to be 
effective in reducing approach speed but not compliance at passive crossings. On the other hand, in-vehicle 
interventions tend to result in driver behavior similar to active crossings, which result in higher compliance when 
trains are approaching railway crossings but with reduced compliance when trains are not present, suggesting issues 
of complacency with such interventions [6]. Such issues are less pronounced with a warning provided as an audio 
message. 
The rail industry is therefore considering alternative options to treat more crossings. One of them is to use lower 
cost equipment with reduced safety integrity level, but with a design that would fail to a safe state: in case of the 
impossibility for the system to know whether a train is approaching, the crossing changes to a passive crossing. This 
is implemented by having a STOP sign coming in front of the flashing lights. While such design is considered safe in 
terms of engineering design, questions remain on the human factors side, particularly since the failure mode of 
traditional flashing lights is to be flashing continuously in Australia.
The objective of this paper is to provide a human factors study evaluating operational performance of a new 
active signage that reverses back to passive controls in case of a right side failure (“safe failure”). A simulation-
based study was conducted to address these questions through the development of specific scenarios in a controlled 
simulation environment. This approach allowed evaluation of the following research questions with statistical 
power:
x What is the current performance of drivers at railway level crossings with passive controls (RX2)?
x What changes are evident in driver performance once the new system is installed and functioning correctly?
x What is the road user performance when the system changes to its safe failure mode, and how does this compare 
to the performance before installation of the new signage.
This was done through the observation of changes of driver behavior in terms of compliance, gaze patterns, 
approach speed and safety distances.
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Fig. 1. Trialed signage in its (a) active mode and (b) when fail to safe mode.
2. Experiment
2.1. Trialed signage
The signage implemented in this study is an active crossing with flashing lights as shown in Fig 1a. When the 
system does not know whether a train is approaching, the crossing changes to a passive crossing: a STOP sign 
comes in front of the flashing lights as in Fig 1b.
2.2. Experimental design
This study was designed to assess the changes to road user behavior when the signage changes to its fail to safe 
mode of operation. The rural level crossing located on Lane, road, Lanefield, Australia was replicated in the driving 
simulator environment (see Figure 2). The familiarization phases were designed to enable participants to initially 
become accustomed to the simulator and to provide them with an environment in which they are exposed to passive
crossings as well as the new signage in its operational mode The study was composed of two sessions, which were 
composed of 12 and 13 repetitions of a similar scenario respectively, varying in terms of signage at the crossing and 
presence of a train. The crossing with train approaching was varied between subjects. Details of these scenarios are 
provided in Table 1. The first half of the first session was a baseline of driver behavior at traditional passive 
crossings with a Stop sign. The second half was used to introduce participants with the trialed signage in its 
operational mode. The second session focused on creating a habit where the trialed signage was reliable, until it 
changed to its fail to safe mode in the middle of the session.
Table 1. Design of the two sessions.
Session 1: RX2 and APRSS (operational) Session 2: APRSS (operational) and APRSS (failure mode)
1a. Familiarization with 3 passive crossings and one train 
approach
2a. Familiarization with one passive crossing and two trialed 
signs in their active mode and one train approach at one of the 
new signs
1b. Five trials with 3 passive crossings and no train approaches 2b. Five trials with one passive crossing and two trialed signs in 
their active mode and no train approaches
1c. Familiarization with one passive crossing and two trialed 
signs in their active mode and one train approach at one of the 
new signs
2c. Familiarization with one passive crossing and two trialed 
signs in their active mode and one train approach at one of the 
new signs
1d. Five trials with one passive crossing and two trialed signs 
in their active mode and no train approaches
2d. Six trials with one passive crossing, one active trialed 
signage and one trialed signage in its fail to safe mode and no 
train approaches. 
a b
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Fig. 2. Typical Australian passive crossing as implemented in the simulator.
A power analysis was used to determine the number of participants required for this study. The required sample 
VL]H1WRREWDLQDVLJQLILFDQWUHVXOWDWOHYHOĮ IRUDSRZHUȕZKHQFRPSDULQJWKHPHDQRIDYDULDEOHRILQWHUHVW
at railway crossings with and without the intervention assuming similar variance [8]. For detecting high size effects 
(d>1), 16 participants are UHTXLUHGDWSRZHUȕ DQGSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHUHTXLUHGIRUDSRZHUȕ 
2.3. Participants
Twenty subjects volunteered to participate in this study. One subject (female) was not able to complete the study 
due to motion sickness on the driving simulator, resulting in a sample size of 19 participants (13 males and 6 
females) aged between 20 and 62 (mean age = 34.8 years, SD = 11.1). Participants had an open Australian driving 
license. All subjects provided written consent for this study, which was approved by the Queensland University of 
Technology ethics committee. Participants were paid AUD $100 for completing the two driving sessions; and AUD 
$20 in case they were not able to complete the study.
2.4. Procedure
Each participant took part in two sessions taking approximately two hours each. During each session, the 
participant was performing a repetitive succession of simulated driving tasks consisting of driving an itinerary from 
start to end. The itinerary was a typical rural Australian road, with 3 passive railway level crossings (requiring to 
stop at the crossing) and two intersections (one with a stop sign, one with right-of-way). Two of the three railway 
crossings were upgraded with the trialed signage in the middle of the first session.
Upon arrival, participants provided written consent to participate in the study, and they were then provided with a 
short familiarization drive in the simulator allowing them to become accustomed to accelerating, stopping, and 
driving though intersections, passive railway crossings and curves.
The second session took place on another day, or a couple of hours after the participant finished the first session. 
While participants were driving, a researcher was manually recording head movements as drivers were driving 
toward railway crossings. The researcher had a table where he could tick the following categories: both sides 
checked, only one side (left or right) checked and no sides checked. From these observations, compliance was 
defined as checking both sides of the crossing before going through the crossing.
2.5. Materials
The study was conducted on CARRS-Q's Advanced Driving Simulator (see Figure 3). The simulator included a 
complete automatic Holden Commodore vehicle with working controls and instruments, and used SCANeR™ 
studio software with eight computers, projectors and a six degree of freedom motion platform. When seated in the 
simulator vehicle, the driver was immersed in a virtual environment which included a 180 degree front field view 
composed of three screens, simulated rear view mirror images on LCD screens, surround sound for engine and 
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Fig. 3. CARRS-Q's advanced driving simulator.
environment noise, real car cabin and simulated vehicle motion. The road and surrounding environment were 
designed to represent, as closely as possible, a rural railway crossing in accordance with Australian Standards at 
railway crossings.
3. Data analysis
The dependent variables under investigation in this data analysis were the following:
x The variation of the approach speed when no train was approaching the crossing. By comparison to the baseline, 
it can be inferred whether subjects treated the crossings with the new signage as passive or active crossings. 
Speed 20 and 40 meters away from the crossing were investigated, as they have been shown by various studies in 
the literature to be distances where speed varies for passive crossings. Speed 150 meters to the crossing was also 
investigated in order to ensure that no differences were present before approaching the crossing and that would 
be unrelated to the crossing itself;
x Compliance with the crossing signage;
x Gaze behavior when participants approach a railway crossing;
x Safety distances: reaction time distance, minimum possible braking distance and safety margin, as defined in [9];
The analysis evaluated how the following independent variables (type of signal at the RLX) had effects on the 
dependent variables presented above:
x RX2 with no train;
x New signage in its active mode, with no train;
x New signage in its safe failure mode, with no train.
Statistical analyses were conducted to evaluate the effects of the different signage conditions. Generalized Linear 
Mixed Modelling was used in order to take into account the repeated measures study design. The statistical package 
R version 3.1.1 was used.
4. Results
4.1. Observed driving behaviors with the trialed signage in its fail to safe mode
The following behaviors have been observed in the driving simulator when the new signage was changed into its 
safe failure mode:
x Stopped without any issues (12 participants);
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x Saw the change in signage the first time (6 participants) but did not have time to stop (2), had to do an emergency 
braking (1) or did not change their behavior and did not stop at the crossing (3);
x Saw the change after a few trials (2 participants), one after 4 trials, one after 6 trials;
x Never saw the change and did not stop  (2 participants);
x Did not change their behavior and did not stop at the crossing, without any indication as to whether they say the 
change in signage (3 participants).
With the participants completing the study, we obtained 32% of participants stopping without any problems with 
the fail safe mode of the new signage; 32% saw the change in the signage at the first trial but experienced 
difficulties in responding to it in a timely manner; 21% did not realize the sign changed; and it was impossible to 
ascertain the behavior of 16% of participants as they were not complying before the change in signage.
4.2. Effects on approach speed
Participants had a similar approach speed 150 meters to the crossing. With the new active signage, participants 
did not need to stop at the crossing anymore, and they only slightly reduced their speed closer to the crossing. 
During the failsafe trial of the signage, observed speeds 40 and 20 meters to the crossing were higher than the ones 
observed during the baseline with RX2 signage (see Table 2).
Table 2. Approach speeds (kph, standard deviations in brackets).
Level crossing 150 meters  40 meters  20 meters   
RX2, no train 75.53 (11.0) 41.40 (19.1) 28.88 (26.1)
New sign in its operational mode, no train 79.55 (10.0) 72.66 (16.2) 72.64 (17.1)
New sign in its failsafe mode, no train 78.34 (15.2) 54.02 (25.7) 34.36 (34.4)
The average speed 40 meters to the crossing was 38.5 kph during the baseline with the traditional passive 
signage. With the trialed signage in the active mode, speed increased by 29.4kph (p<.001), highlighting the fact that 
drivers did not need to stop at the crossing anymore. In its fail to safe mode, speed increased by 7.8 kph (p<.001). It 
has also to be noted that speed linearly increased with the number of trials with a factor .55 (p<.001). This means 
that on average, participants speed increased by 7.2 kph by the time they reached the last trial run. This highlights 
the familiarity issue at crossings. Similar trends were observed 20 meters to the crossing.
4.3. Effects on stopping compliance
The average stopping probability with the traditional passive signage was 55.2% (see Table 3). Statistical 
analysis showed that the probability of stopping changed with the new signage to 0.4% (p<.001) in the active mode, 
showing that participants were mostly not stopping anymore at the crossing, which is what was expected in this 
mode of operation. No difference with the fail to safe mode of the trialed signage was statistically significant as 
compared to the traditional passive signage. The difference in percentage in Table 4 is mainly due to the decrement 
in performance over time. The design of this study can only detect large effects due to the sample size chosen. A 
medium size effect on compliance at the crossing could be expected, as the decrement observed approached the limit 
for statistical significance. 
Table 3. Stopping probability (standard deviation in brackets).
Level crossing Stopping probability   
Passive crossing, no train 55.2% (.50)
Trialed sign in its operational mode, no train 0.4% (.06)
Trialed sign in its fail to safe mode, no train 39.5% (.49)
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Fig. 4. Typical Australian passive crossing as implemented in the simulator.
4.4. Effects on head movements toward rail tracks
Statistical analyses showed that participants checked on average both sides of the rail track 86.1% of the time for 
the traditional passive signage. With the trialed signage, this percentage decreased to 79.5% (p<.001) in its active 
mode and this percentage decreased by 1.8% (p=.002) in its fail to safe mode.
4.5. Effects on safety distance
Statistical analyses were conducted to evaluate whether the trialed signage had any effects on the time at which 
drivers started to release the accelerator and push the brake pedal for complying participants. Such analyses showed 
that there was no effect of the different signage on the time when the accelerator pedal was released. A small but 
statistically significant difference was observed for the moment the brake pedal was pushed for the trialed signage in 
its active mode (p<.001), participants pushing the pedal 0.6 second earlier. Analysis also showed that speed at the 
moment the brake pedal was pushed was similar in all conditions. Distance metrics (reaction time distance, 
minimum possible braking distance and safety margin) are shown to be very similar in all conditions (see Table 4
and Figure 4).
Table 4. Safety distances (standard deviation in brackets).
Level crossing Reaction Time distance Minimum braking distance Safety margin   
RX2, no train 83.4 (56.5) 31.7 (10.6) 128.8 (47.9)
RX2, ITS, no train 69.7 (53.0) 34.6 (10.5) 132.2 (58.3)
RX2, failing ITS, train approaching 75.6 (56.0) 31.5 (13.0) 118.9 (58.0)
5. Discussion
The simulator study gave insights of the potential human factor issues of the introduction of an active signage 
that changed to a passive signage in case of a safe failure. During normal operation of the trialed signage (active 
mode), drivers behaved as for active crossings, with higher speeds and reduced visual checks toward the railway 
crossing. Drivers behaved as would have been expected, and no particular issues are raised for this mode of 
operation, as long as the crossing is adapted to the driving behavior changes. Indeed higher speeds require better 
road surfacing and also higher sighting distances.
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The sudden transition to the fail to safe mode of operation of the trialed signage showed that while most 
participants did not experience difficulties in identifying the change in signage and responding appropriately to the 
new signage, 45% of drivers reacted to the change in signage either too late, or did not react at all, particularly the 
first time they encountered the fail to safe mode of operation. During the fail to safe mode of operation, participants 
were expected to stop in the same way as for traditional stop signs, but their approach speed was quite larger, 
suggesting that participants took more time to realize that they were expected to stop as compared to traditional 
signage. Observed speed differences 40 meters to the crossing were quite large. While it is expected during the 
active mode of the trialed signage, data suggest that when the system fails into its safe mode, participants were not 
able to return to the same driving pattern as for the traditional passive signage.
For compliant participants, other metrics, such as reaction times, distance reaction times and safety margin were 
similar for the standard passive crossings with stop signs and the fail to safe mode of operation trialed in this study. 
This suggests that a time is required for drivers to understand the fail to safe mode of operation, but after such 
period, the driver behavior tend to the one observed at standard passive crossings.
This study highlighted a number of human factors issues with such design. As drivers approach the crossing with 
faster speeds, they have less time to react to a change of signage. This is worsened by the fact that participants take 
more time to analyze and comprehend a signage that they have never seen before. Further, the salience of the fail to 
safe mode is not high enough for attracting the attention of drivers who are only looking for flashing lights at active 
crossings, particularly since traditional signage also uses flashing lights in case of safe failure. Such issues are of 
particular concern as the usual trend with the introduction of new interventions and new signage in the road safety 
domain tend to result in positive effects at first (novelty effect), before a gradual return to the previous behavior
[10]. If such system was to be implemented at railway crossings, a human factors analysis would need to be 
completed in order to evaluate whether education is a solution to mitigate the lack of detection of the signage in the 
fail to safe mode of operation, given the fact that drivers would rarely encounter such a mode of operation.
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